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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
David Melvin ("Melvin") appeals from a November 10,1998 Memorandum Decision
by the Third Judicial District Court, Judge David S. Young, denying Motions for Relief From
Judgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (2) and (3).1 On December 8, 1998,
Melvin filed his Notice of Appeal with the Utah Supreme Court.2 Pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996), the Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of
Appeals. Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue No, 1: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Melvin's Motions
for Relief From Judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) (mistake), (2) (newly discovered evidence)
and (3) (fraud), thus letting stand its earlier Order granting Franklin Covey Client Sales,
Inc.fs Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Melvin's Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Personal Jurisdiction?

Kelvin raised the following five post-judgment motions in the trial court below: Motion
for Relief From Judgment (Rule 60(b)(1)), Motion for Relief From Judgment (Rule 60(b)(2),
(3)), Motion for Sanctions, Motion to Stay and Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal. In
this appeal, Melvin raises only those issues that were contained in his Motions for Relief From
Judgment under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (2) and (3).
2

This case involves Melvin's "Second Notice of Appeal." Melvin previously filed a
Notice of Appeal ("First Notice of Appeal") in an attempt to appeal the trial court's July 27, 1998
Declaratory Judgment. However, Melvin's First Notice of Appeal wasfiled46 days after the
trial court entered its Declaratory Judgment. (First Notice of Appeal, R. 424). Consequently, on
December 9, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court dismissed Melvinfs first appeal (Case No. 981578)
as untimely. (Supreme Court's Dec. 9,1998 Order, R. 681). This case is before this Court based
upon Melvin's Second Notice of Appeal and relates only to Melvin's post-judgment Rule 60(b)
motions.
1
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Standard of Review: The trial court has discretion in determining whether to
grant or deny a movant's Rule 60(b) motion and the trial court's ruling will be reversed
only when there has been an abuse of discretion. Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 205, 206
(Utah 1998); Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Birch v. Birch.
Ill P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Issue No, 2: Did the trial court correctly determine that it could exercise specific
:

personal jurisdiction over Melvin?

-

Standard of Review: When reviewing a claim for lack of personal jurisdiction, J1 the standard of review is a correction-of-error standard, even though the movant's claim
was made under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. State Dep't of Social
Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A.
Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Real party in interest Every
action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor,
administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose
name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute
may sue in that persons name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is
brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall
be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground
that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has
been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder
or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution
shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real
party in interest.

2
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B.
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Mistakes; inadvertence;
excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgement is void; (5)
the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time
and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by
an independent action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Melvin was employed by Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. ("Franklin Covey") as an

account executive from November 1, 1995 until September 12, 1997. (Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 100). Prior to the spring of 1997, Melvin was
paid a base salary plus commission. (Id. atR. 99). In April 1997, Melvin was informed that
his employment would be terminated for inadequate sales. {Id.). Melvin requested to keep
hisjob and offered to work on a straight commission basis. {Id.). Franklin Covey agreed and
the parties executed an express agreement (the "Compensation Agreement"). {Id. at 100).
The Compensation Agreement provided that Melvin would be paid on a straight commission
3
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basis and that commissions would be paid "only for those services delivered while you are
employed by Franklin." (Exhibit B to Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, R. 114) (emphasis added).
On September 12, 1997, Franklin Covey terminated Melvin's employment. Franklin
Covey paid Melvin his commissions for all sales of services and products that were delivered *
before his termination date. Melvin signed a release acknowledging receipt of payment (the
"Release"). (Exhibit C to Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
R. 116). A few months later, Melvinfs attorney sent Franklin Covey a draft Complaint to be ~
filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland and a letter demanding
payment for $600,000.00 in commissions on a theory of quantum meruit for any sales or
services which could conceivably be delivered after Melvinfs termination. (Exhibit B to
Franklin Covey's Complaint, R. 7-13). In response, Franklin Covey filed a declaratory
judgment action in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, requesting a
declaration of rights and obligations of the parties based upon the parties1 Compensation
Agreement and Melvin's Release. (Franklin Covey's Complaint, R. 1-13).
B.

Course of Proceedings Below
After Franklin Covey filed its declaratory judgment action, Melvin removed this case

to the United States District Court for the District of Utah.3 (Melvin's Removal, R.16-17).
3

After Franklin Coveyfiledits Declaratory Judgment Action in the Third Judicial District
Court in Salt Lake County, Melvin inundated the trial court and Franklin Covey with a constant
(continued...)
4
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Thereafter, Franklin Covey filed a Motion to Remand and a Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Franklin Covey's Motion to Remand, R. 33-42; Franklin Covey's Motion for Summary
Judgment, R. 93-95). Melvin opposed Franklin's Motion to Remand and filed a Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction or in the Alternative to Change Venue. (Melvin's
First Motion to Dismiss, R. 48-49). On May 11,1998, the U.S. District Court remanded this
case to state court. (Order, R. 203-205).
In state court, Melvin filed a second Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction, which was virtually identical to his first Motion to Dismiss filed in federal court.
(Melvin's Second Motion to Dismiss, R. 248). Thereafter, Franklin Covey submitted its
Motion for Summary Judgment and both of Melvin's Motions to Dismiss for decision.
(Notices to Submit, R. 217-18; 357-59). On June 26,1998, the trial court held a hearing on
Melvin's Motions to Dismiss and Franklin Covey's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Hearing
Transcript, R. 686). On July 14, 1998, Judge Young entered an Order denying Melvin's
Motions to Dismiss. (Judge Young's Order, R. 393-94). In the same Order, Judge Young
granted Franklin Covey's Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding that there were no
genuine issues of material fact and Franklin Covey was entitled to judgment as a matter of

3

(...continued)
flow of procedural and jurisdictional pleadings and amended pleadings on topics such as
removal, personal jurisdiction, standing and venue. To assist the Court in following the
procedural history of this case through several courts and numerous pleadings, Franklin Covey
has attached as Exhibit 1 in the Addendum a chart chronicling this case's progression through the
courts below.
5
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law. (Id.). On July 27,1998, based upon its ruling on Franklin Covey's Motion for Summary
Judgment, the trial court entered a final Declaratory Judgment finding that Franklin Covey
was a "person interested'1 under the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act and declaring that (1)
the Release signed by Melvin barred any claim for commissions for sales prior to the date
of Melvin's termination; and (2) the parties' express Compensation Agreement barred any
quantum meruit claim by Melvin for post-termination commissions. (Declaratory Judgment
Order, R. 410-12).

,r

On September 11, 1998, 46 days after the trial court's final Judgment, Melvin filed:a Notice of Appeal. (First Notice of Appeal, R. 424). On December 9, 1998, the Supreme
Court dismissed Melvin's appeal as untimely. (Supreme Court's Dec. 9, 1998 Order, R.
681). As a result of his untimely First Appeal of the Declaratory Judgment, Melvin cannot
obtain appellate review of the Declaratory Judgment or any prior orders of the trial
court.
After filing his untimely First Notice of Appeal, Melvin returned to the trial court.
On October 8, 1998, Melvin filed the following five post-judgment motions with the trial
court: (1) Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal; (2) Motion to Stay; (3) Motion for
Sanctions; (4) Motion for Relief From Judgment (Rule 60(b)(1)); and (5) Motion for Relief
From Judgment (Rules 60(b)(2) and (3)). On November 10, 1998, Judge Young issued a
Memorandum Decision denying all five of Melvin's post-judgment motions. (Memorandum
Decision, R. 662-666). On December 8, 1998, Melvin filed the instant appeal which
6
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challenges Judge Young's Memorandum Decision denying Melvin's Motion(s) for Relief
From Judgment. (Melvin's Second Notice of Appeal, R. 667). On February 8, 1999, the
Utah Supreme Court transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals. (Supreme Court's
Feb. 8, 1999 Order, R. 682).
C.

Disposition of the Court Below
In its November 10, 1998 Memorandum Decision, the trial court denied all of

Melvin's post-judgment motions. Melvin's two Motions for Relief From Judgment or Order
under Rule 60(b)(1), (2) and (3) were denied because the court determined that Melvin failed
to demonstrate the existence of mistake, newly discovered evidence or fraud that would
warrant relief from judgment. (Memorandum Decision, R. 664). In this appeal, Melvin
does not appeal the trial court's ruling on his post-judgment Motion for Extension of Time
for Appeal, Motion for Sanctions, or Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment. The only
issue now on appeal is the trial court's November 10, 1998 Memorandum Decision
denying Melvin's Motions for Relief From Judgment under Rule 60(b)(1), (2) and (3)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Melvin was employed by Franklin Covey as an account executive from November 1,
1995 until September 12, 1997. (Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, R. 100). He was paid on a base salary plus commission basis until the spring of
1997. {Id. at R. 99). In April 1997, Franklin Covey informed Melvin that his employment
7
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would be terminated as a result of inadequate sales. Melvin asked to keep his job and offered
to work on a straight commission basis. {Id.). Franklin Covey and Melvin then executed the
Compensation Agreement. {Id. at R. 100). The Compensation Agreement confirmed
Franklin Covey's long-standing policy and practice providing that account executives, such
as Melvin, were ineligible to receive commissions on seminars held or products sold after ^
the account executive's termination.

Specifically, Melvin and Franklin Covey's -

Compensation Agreement provided: "According to Franklin policy, commissions are paid only for those services delivered while you are employed by Franklin." (Exhibit B to Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 114) (emphasis added).
On September 12, 1997, Franklin Covey terminated Melvin's employment. {Id. at
R. 101). Franklin Covey paid Melvin $2,029.57 for commissions for all sales of services and
products that were delivered before Melvin's September 12,1997 termination date. (Exhibit
C to Franklin Covey's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement, R. 116).
Melvin signed the Release acknowledging receipt of payment and releasing Franklin Covey
"from all liability arising out of its failure to pay [Melvin] commissions for sales completed
before [Melvin's] termination on September 12,1997." {Id.)
A few months later, Melvin's attorney sent Franklin Covey a draft Complaint to be
filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland and a demand for
$600,000.00 on a theory of quantum meruit for sales or services which could conceivably be
delivered after Melvin's termination. (Franklin Covey Complaint, R. 3, Exhibit B to
8
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Franklin Covey's Complaint, R. 7-13). In spite of the fact that this demand violated the
express terms of the Compensation Agreement, Melvin threatened to file the Complaint if
Franklin Covey did not pay. (Id.; see also Exhibit B to Melvinfs Memorandum in Support
of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, R. 78-79).

Based on the parties1 Compensation

Agreement and the Release, Franklin Covey filed a declaratory judgment action in the Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. In its declaratory judgment action, Franklin
Covey requested a declaration that it had "no obligation to pay Melvin compensation or
commissions for potential future sales or for seminars scheduled or products sold subsequent
to the effective date of Melvinfs termination" as well as a declaration that the Release barred
Melvin's claims regarding any "other claims related to payment of compensation or
commissions for services performed by Melvin during his employment with Franklin
Covey." (Franklin Covey's Complaint, R. 5).
Approximately three weeks after Franklin Coveyfiledits declaratory judgment action,
Melvin filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
("Maryland Complaint") almost identical to the draft complaint previously sent to Franklin
Covey. (Exhibit A to Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 106).
Melvin's Maryland Complaint demanded payment on the basis of quantum meruit for sales
and services delivered after Melvin's termination and commission for any potential future
sales to any potential future customers with whom Melvin alleged he had any contact. (Id.
at R. 12). The trial court subsequently concluded that Melvin's undisputed Release
9
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barred any claims for commissions prior to Melvin's termination and that the express
terms of Melvin's undisputed Compensation Agreement barred his quantum meruit
claim for post-termination commissions. Accordingly, the trial court granted Franklin
Covey's Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court also denied Melvin's Motions to
Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Judge Young's Order, R. 393-94).

A^ •

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Melvin's First Notice of Appeal has already been dismissed as untimely. The current.---..:
appeal embraces only the trial court's November 10, 1998 Memorandum Decision denying-:.--•Melvin's Rule 60(b) motions. Yet, Melvin's Brief nonchalantly and incorrectly assumes
entitlement to full merit review of the trial court's rulings below and endeavors to confuse
the issues presented and applicable standards of review. The only decision on appeal is the
trial court's Memorandum Decision denying Melvin's Rule 60(b) motions. This Court
reviews a trial court's ruling on a 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. As demonstrated in
this brief, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Melvin's Motions for Relief
from Judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) (mistake), (2) (new evidence) and (3) (fraud).
Melvin asserted in his Rule 60(b)(1) motion, and now on appeal, that the trial court
made five "mistakes" that justified relief from the court's prior rulings. The first mistake,
according to Melvin, is that Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. was not his employer and,

10
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therefore, had no standing to bring its declaratory judgment action against him.4 The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying this aspect of Melvin's Motion for Relief From
Judgment for several reasons. First, it was undisputed that there was only one employment
relationship and the terms of that relationship were unequivocally established by the
undisputed Compensation Agreement. Second, Melvin's actual employer was Franklin
Covey Client Sales, Inc. and this fact was repeatedly established by reference to Melvin's IRS
form W-2 for tax year 1997, which Melvin admitted receiving. Third, even if Franklin
Covey Client Sales, Inc. had not been Melvin's actual employer, Rule 17 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure specifically provides that a party in whose name a contract has been made
for the benefit of another may sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose
benefit the action is brought. Thus, even if Franklin Covey Co. had been Melvin's actual
employer, Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. would still be permitted to sue in its own name
without joining Franklin Covey Co. Fourth, to the extent necessary (if at all) Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc. received a precautionary assignment from Franklin Covey Co. of "any
rights which may be necessary to entitle Plaintiff to prosecute this action as the real party-ininterest" Finally, Franklin Covey Co. consented to be bound by the judgment entered in this

4

Melvin confuses the issue of whether Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. had standing to
assert its declaratory judgment action as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Despite his
incorrect nomenclature, the issue is one of standing, not subject matter jurisdiction, which the
trial court clearly had in this case.
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action to the same extent as Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. (plaintiff below) thereby
assuring Melvin of a full recovery from both entities of any commissions owed to him.
The second "mistake," according to Melvin, is that the facts in the summary judgment
record do not support the trial court's Declaratory Judgment. However, Franklin Covey
presented undisputed material facts demonstrating that the Compensation Agreement
expressly precluded commissions for sales and services after Melvin?s termination.
Additionally, pursuant to the Release, it was undisputed that Melvin had been paid all
commissions for services and products delivered as of the date of termination. These two
undisputed facts completely disposed of the narrow legal question presented. Accordingly,
the trial court determined, as a matter of law, that there were no genuine issues of material
fact and the express agreements precluded Melvin from receiving past and potential future
commissions. This determination fully supported the trial court's Declaratory Judgment.
The third "mistake," according to Melvin, is that the trial court abused its discretion
when it allegedly extended its order to cover Maryland law even though Maryland law had
not been briefed. Melvin profoundly misunderstands the trial court's ruling. The trial court
did not extend its order to cover Maryland law. The trial court merely determined that both
Utah and Maryland law were identical regarding the issue of quantum meruit and, therefore,
it did not need to conduct a conflicts of laws analysis in making its determination.
The fourth "mistake," according to Melvin, is that the trial court abused its discretion
in ruling on Franklin Covey's Motion for Summary Judgement without affording Melvin an
12
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opportunity to conduct discovery. In the instant case, two material facts were undisputed.
The Release provided that Melvin was not entitled to compensation prior to his termination
and the Compensation Agreement provided that Melvin was not entitled to compensation
after his termination. No additional discovery could change these undisputed facts which
exclusively control disposition of this case. Moreover, Melvin failed to demonstrate that any
additional discovery was material and of a substantial nature.
The fifth "mistake," according to Melvin, is that the trial court "mechanically adopted"
the findings of fact and conclusions of law presented by counsel for Franklin Covey. This
argument completely misapprehends the summary judgment procedure. In the context of
Rule 56, the court does not make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rather, the court
determines whether a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon facts as to
which there is no genuine dispute. Moreover, Melvin has waived this issue by failing to raise
it below—a failure to which he admits in his brief. Therefore, this issue has not been
preserved for appeal.
In addition to his allegations of mistake, Melvin asserted in his Rule 60(b)(2) motion
that allegedly "new evidence" justified setting aside the trial court's prior Order. The alleged
"new evidence" is Franklin Covey Co.fs Answer to a Complaint filed against it by a former
employee in California. In its Answer to the California Complaint, Franklin Covey Co.
asserted that Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. was the plaintiffs true employer. This
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position is identical to that asserted in this case and perfectly consistent with the trial court's
earlier rulings and provided no basis for the trial court to set aside its earlier rulings.
In his Rule 60(b)(3) motion, Melvin argued that the existence offraudjustified setting
aside the trial court's prior orders. Melvin's fraud claim is grounded on the mistaken belief
that Franklin Covey Co.'s counsel lacked authority to submit the Consent to be Bound on
behalf of Franklin Covey Co. Because Melvin professed confusion as to whether he was
employed by Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. or Franklin Covey Co., Franklin Covey Co.
filed a pleading advising the Court that any rights necessary to perfect Franklin Covey Client
Sales, Inc.'s standing had been assigned and that Franklin Covey Co. agreed to be bound by
any judgment, thus assuring Melvin of entitlement to recover from both entities. Melvin
claims this pleading was fraudulent because he disbelieves that this law firm actually
represents Franklin Covey Co. This position is absurd. Melvin is well aware that this law
firm represents both Franklin Covey Co. and Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. In fact, he
is also aware that this law firm entered an appearance on behalf of both entities when he
sued both entities in Maryland federal court. His fraud argument is completely disingenuous
and does not entitle him to relief from the trial court's prior rulings.
Finally, the trial court also determined correctly that it had specific personal
jurisdiction over Melvin. It was undisputed that Melvin admitted significant contacts and tSR
trips to Utah directly related to his employment. Moreover, Melvin's Maryland Complaint
demanded payment from Franklin Covey for work he specifically asserted he performed in
14
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Utah. (Exhibit B to Franklin Covey's Complaint, R. 11). Melvin came to Utah to conduct
business, he conducted business, and demanded payment for what he did here. That
is "purposeful availment." Accordingly, the trial court concluded correctly that it could
exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Melvin.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
MELVIN'S RULE 60(b) MOTIONS.
The only decision on appeal is Judge Young's November 10, 1998 Memorandum

Decision denying Melvin's Motions for Relief From Judgment or Order under Rule 60(b)(1)
(mistake), (2) (newly discovered evidence) and (3) (fraud).5 The standard of review
applicable to the trial court's post-judgment rulings is abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Ostler
v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998) ("A trial court has discretion in determining
whether a movant has shown 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect/ and this
Court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when there has been an abuse of discretion.");
Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52, 58 (Utah 1984) (abuse of discretion review for trial court's

5

Rule 60(b) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his
legal representativefroma final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)fraud(whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party
UTAH R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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Rule 60(b) determinations); Birch v. Birch, 111 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(same). Under this standard, the Court "will not reverse unless the decision exceeds the
limits of reasonability." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993); Crookston v.
Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). As demonstrated below, the trial court
acted appropriately when it sustained its prior orders and rejected Melvinfs Rule 60(b)
arguments.
A.

r'
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Determining That it Made
No Mistake Justifying Relief From Judgment Under Rule 60(b)(1).
1.

The Trial Court Made No Mistake and Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
Determining That Franklin Covey Co. Had Standing.

Melvin was employed by Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.6 However, in his
pleadings below, and now on appeal, Melvin professes confusion as to whether Franklin
Covey Client Sales, Inc. or Franklin Covey was his employer. Melvin asserts that Franklin
Covey Co. was his employer and, therefore, it was "inappropriate for [Franklin Covey Client
Sales, Inc.] to attempt to obtain judgment against [Melvin] on behalf of Franklin Covey Co.
without joining Franklin Covey Co." (Appellant's Brief at 36). As demonstrated below,

^This fact was repeatedly established by reference to Melvin's IRS form W-2 for tax year
1997. Moreover, Melvin admits that he received his W-2fromFranklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.
(Appellant's Brief at 35). Despite receiving his W-2 form from Franklin Covey Client Sales,
Inc., Melvin asserts that Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. was a "mystery" to him when this case
was initiated by it. (Id. at 36). It is exactly because of this professed confusion and
gamesmanship that Franklin Covey Co. decided to moot the issue by executing the assignment
and Consent to be Bound.
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however, Melvinfs argument regarding the identity of his employer is frivolous and the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied this aspect of Melvin's Rule 60(b)(1) motion.
a.

Melvin's alleged confusion about the identity of his employer
is irrelevant because there is only one employment
relationship.

In his demand letter to Franklin Covey and in his Maryland Complaint, Melvin sought
to recover commissions for sales of products and services which occurred after his
termination on the basis of quantum meruit. (Exhibit B to Franklin Coveyfs Complaint,
R. 12). In Franklin Covey's declaratory judgment action and Motion for Summary Judgment,
Franklin Covey presented the trial court with an express Compensation Agreement between
the parties that provided that Melvin was not entitled to commissions for sales and services
delivered after his employment ended. (Exhibit B to Franklin Covey's Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 114-15). Thus, the trial court was presented
with a straightforward legal question: Can Melvin assert a claim under quantum meruit for
post termination commissions when his express Compensation Agreement prohibited it?
The answer to this question is the same whether Melvin was employed by Franklin
Covey Client Sales, Inc. or Franklin Covey Co. Either way, there was only one employment
relationship.

The terms of that relationship were established by the undisputed

Compensation Agreement. The rights of Franklin Covey (whether Franklin Covey Co. or
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.) and Melvin are established by that Agreement, and
Melvin's attempt to obtain quasi-contract recovery on a claim is precluded by that
17
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Agreement. Melvin could not avoid the judicial determination required by the undisputed
facts by professing confusion as to whether he was employed by the parent or the subsidiary.
Accordingly, whether Franklin Covey Co. or Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. was his
employer was and is irrelevant to the narrow legal issue presented by this case.
b.

Melviris alleged confusion about the identity of his employer
is irrelevant because the action was binding against both
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. and Franklin Covey Co.

Melvinfs complains he was disadvantaged because the declaratory judgment action
was brought by Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. and not Franklin Covey Co. This
complaint is senseless because the declaratory judgment action was binding against both
Franklin Covey Co. and Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Franklin Covey Co. Melvin's attempt to evade the substance of this action by professing
confusion about which entity was his employer is useless for at least two reasons.
First, Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides: ff[A] party
with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another . . . may
sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is
brought" U.R.C.P. 17(a) (emphasis added). Thus, even if this action redounded to the
benefit of Franklin Covey Co., Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. was permitted to sue in its
own name without joining Franklin Covey Co.
Second, to the extent necessary (if at all) Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. received
a precautionary assignment from Franklin Covey Co. of "any rights which may be necessary
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to entitle Plaintiff to prosecute this action as the real party-in-interest.ff

(Exhibit B to

Franklin Covey's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R.
303). Further, Franklin Covey Co. consented to be bound by the judgment entered in this
action to the same extent as Plaintiff ("Consent to be Bound"). (Id.). Thus, Rule 17s
purpose of ensuring that the "defendant will be permitted to assert all defenses or
counterclaims available against the real owner of the cause" was clearly satisfied. Shaw v.
Jeppson, 239 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1952).
Melvin complains in his brief that Franklin Covey Co. is attempting to evade its
obligations. However, Franklin Covey Co.'s actions are decidedly opposite from an attempt
to evade obligations. Franklin Covey's consent to be bound operates to accept, not evade,
liability. Melvin is helped by the assignment between Franklin Covey Co. and Franklin
Covey Client Sales, Inc. in at least two ways. First, it assures him of the opportunity to raise
all available defenses to the declaratory judgment action. Second, it assures Melvin of the
ability to recover on commissions to which he can establish entitlement from both entities.
Every concern of which Melvin complains is positively satisfied by Franklin Covey Co.'s
Consent to be Bound. Quite simply, Franklin Covey Co/s filing of its Consent to be Bound
makes Melvin's argument moot by giving him additional security and ensuring that plaintiff
Franklin Covey Client sales, Inc. was the real party in interest. See Lynch v. MacDonald,
367 P.2d 464, 468 (Utah 1962) ("The general rule is that an assignee is the real party in
interest").
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Melvin's effort to contest the validity of the precautionary assignment is pointless.
There is absolutely no dispute between the parties to the assignment as to its validity.
Franklin Covey Co. unequivocally assigned to Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. "any and
all rights and obligations relating to or arising out of David Melvin's employment with
Franklin Covey Co." Franklin Covey Co. also assigned "any and all rights that may be
necessary, if any, to entitle Assignee to prosecute, as the real party in interest, any legal
proceedings concerning David Melvin." (Exhibit F to Franklin Covey's Memorandum in
Opposition to Melvin's Motions for Relief From Judgment or Order, R. 617). A copy of the
actual assignment was provided to Melvin and the trial court and neither Franklin Covey Co.
(the assignor) nor Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. (the assignee) disputes the existence and
validity of the assignment. Melvin was not a party to the assignment and has no basis nor
standing upon which to dispute its validity. Indeed, it is perplexing that Melvin would even
dispute the assignment given that the assignment positively enures to his benefit.
2.

The Trial Court Made No Mistake and Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
Finding That the Facts in the Record Support its Summary Judgment
Order.

Franklin Covey presented the trial court with two unambiguous and undisputed
agreements which supported the trial court's summary judgment Order and Declaratory
Judgment. The undisputed Release conclusively established that Melvin had been paid all
commissions for services and products delivered as of the date of his termination. (Franklin
Covey's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 101, Exhibit C of
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Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 116). The undisputed
Compensation Agreement provided in express terms that Melvin was to be paid
commissions "only for those products and services delivered while [he was] employed by
Franklin." (Id. at R. 100, Exhibit B of Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, R. 114). The Release absolutely foreclosed any claim for commissions prior to
his termination date and the Compensation Agreement absolutely foreclosed any claims for
commissions after his termination date. Moreover, case law authority in Maryland and Utah
provide unequivocally that quantum meruit recovery is not available where there is an
express agreement between the parties. Therefore, Melvin's claim in quantum meruit was
instantly and totally decimated by the existence of these two express agreements.
Because these two agreements foreclosed any genuine issue of material fact, the trial
court correctly determined that Franklin Covey was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
(Judge Young's Order, R. 393-94). The trial court's Declaratory Judgment was based upon
and supported by the outcome of its summary judgment Order. Therefore, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Melvin's Motion for Relief From Judgment under Rule
60(b)(1) when it refused to set aside its earlier Order granting Franklin Covey's Motion for
Summary Judgment and its Declaratory Judgment.
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3.

The Trial Court Made No Mistake and Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
Finding That No Conflicts of Laws Analysis Was Needed Where the
Result Would be the Same in Both Utah and Maryland.

Melvin profoundly misunderstands the trial court's ruling regarding Maryland law.
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Franklin Covey argued that Melvin's claim for
quantum meruit was unmeritorious because such a claim can exist only where there is no - ^
express agreement. (Franklin Covey's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary ~
Judgment, R. 101-103). In making its argument below, Franklin Covey cited several Utah
cases holding that quantum meruit did not apply where an express agreement existed. {Id. ~
at R. 102-103). Franklin Covey pointed out that Maryland law was identical on this point.
{Id. atR. 103). See, e.g., Mass Transit Admin v. Granite Constr. Co., 471 A.2d 1121, 1126
(Md. Ct. App. 1984) ("When there is an express contract dealing specifically with the
services rendered, quantum meruit is unavailable."). Thus, the trial court did not need to
engage in a conflicts of laws analysis to determine which state's law (Utah or Maryland)
would apply because the result would be the same under either. When Melvin raised this
issue in his Rule 60(b)(1) Motion for Relief of Judgment, the trial court made no mistake in
refusing to set aside the Declaratory Judgment.
4.

The Trial Court Made No Mistake and Did Not Abuse its Discretion
by Ruling on Franklin Covers Motion for Summary Judgment Without
a Continuance.

Melvin also incorrectly asserts that whenever a motion for continuance is made
because discovery is not yet completed the court should automatically grant that motion.
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(Appellant's Brief at 46-47). Accordingly, Melvin argues that the trial court should not have
ruled on Franklin Covey's Motion for Summary Judgment without affording Melvin an
opportunity to conduct discovery. Again, Melvin makes no allegation that the trial court
made any mistake and abused its discretion; he simply disagrees with the court's ruling. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion on ruling on Franklin Covey's Motion for Summary
Judgment when it did. Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent
part:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit
facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery
to be had or may make such other order as is just.
UTAH

R. CIV. P. 56(f). Trial courts may properly deny such motions "where they are found

to be 'lacking in merit.'" American Towers Owners Assoc, v. CCIMechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d
1182, 1195 (Utah 1996) (quoting Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah
1994)). The trial court may also deny such motion where it is found to be dilatory.
Crossland Sav., v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243-44 (Utah 1994).
Moreover, a Rule 56(f) movant must explain how the continuance will aid his
opposition to summary judgment and the additional discovery requested by the movant must
be material and of a substantial nature. American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1195. In American
Towers, the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
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denying a Rule 56(f) motion to continue discovery where the plaintiffs claims failed as a
matter of law and where the facts the plaintiff sought to discover were irrelevant to
those issues, Id.; see also Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) (trial court should not grant Rule 56(f) motion to protect party from merits of motion
for summary judgment).

^'

In this case, two material facts were undisputed: the Release provided that Melvin was not entitled to compensation prior to his termination and the Compensation Agreement
provided that Melvin was not entitled to compensation after his termination. No additional
discovery could change these undisputed facts to which Melvin had already admitted. Based
upon the two undisputed facts, the trial court could determine as a matter of law that Melvin
was not entitled to compensation for sales delivered either prior to or after his termination.
Thus, as in American Towers, the trial court found that Melvin's claims were lacking in merit
and Franklin Covey was entitled to judgment. There were no additional facts necessary to
this determination.7
7

Melvin argues that he asserted in his response to Franklin Covey's Motion for Summary
Judgment that the agreements were ambiguous and there had been no meeting of the minds.
There is no discovery that would have assisted the trial court with regard to these defenses
because whether a contract is ambiguous is strictly a question of law as is the interpretation
of that contract. Frontier Foundations, Inc. v. Layton Constr. Co., 818 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991). Moreover, the trial court was not required to inquire into the potentially
divergent understandings of the parties to determine the meaning of the Compensation
Agreement because parol evidence could not have been considered unless the Agreement was
ambiguous. Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060,1062 (Utah 1981) ("[I]t is only when
an ambiguity exists which cannot be reconciled by an objective and reasonable interpretation of
the contract as a whole that resort may be had to the use of extrinsic evidence.,f). The trial court
(continued...)
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In addition, Melvin failed to articulate the additional discovery he would conduct if
the continuance were granted. He also failed to demonstrate that the additional discovery he
requested was material and of a substantial nature. Melvin also failed to submit an
affidavit in support of a continuance as specifically required by Rule 56(f). Thus, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Melvin?s Motion for Relief From Judgment
under Rule 60(b)(1) when it affirmed its earlier decision to rule on Franklin Covey's Motion
for Summary Judgment.
5.

The Trial Court Did Not Mechanically Adopt Any Findings of Fact or
Conclusions of Law.
a.

Melvin did not preserve the issue of "Mechanical Adoption."

Melvin argues on appeal that the trial court "mechanically adopted the findings of fact
and conclusions of law" presented by counsel for Franklin Covey. (Appellant's Brief at 42).
As Melvin correctly recognizes in his principal brief, this issue was not raised with the trial
court in Melvinfs Rule 60(b) motions. In his brief, Melvin states, f,[t]his issue was not
raised with the trial court because it did not become relevant until after the trial court made
its rulings." (Appellant's Brief at 4). However, Melvin failed to raise this issue in his Rule
60(b) motions, which he made after the trial court had entered its final Declaratory
Judgment. Melvin clearly had an opportunity to raise this argument in his Rule 60(b)

7

(...continued)
correctly determined that the Compensation Agreement was not ambiguous and did not abuse its
discretion in interpreting it as a matter of law.
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motions, but failed to do so. This issue has not been preserved for appeal. See Hart v. Salt
Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129-30 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (to preserve issue for
appeal, party must first raise issue before trial court); West One Bank, Utah v. Life Ins. Co.,
887 P.2d 880, 882 n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (issue must be submitted to trial court for ruling
to preserve an issue for appeal).
b.

The trial court did not make a mistake by applying the summary
judgment standard rather than making findings of fact and
conclusions of law.

Even if this issue were properly before this Court, Melvinfs argument is without merit
for two reasons. First, in ruling on Franklin Covey's Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial
court was required to apply the summary judgment standard and was not required to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that summary judgment will be granted if "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." UTAH
R.CIV. P. 56(c).
Second, the trial court did not "mechanically adopt the findings of fact and
conclusions of law" presented by counsel for Franklin Covey. Rather, the trial court ruled
on Franklin Covey's Motion for Summary Judgment, finding there were "no genuine issues
of material fact and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law," (Judge Young's
Order, R. 393-94). The trial court made this ruling after "having read briefs and memoranda
submitted by the parties and the accompanying attachments and having considered the
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relevant authorities." {Id. at R. 394). Accordingly, the trial court did not make any mistake
or abuse its discretion and its decision should be affirmed.
B.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Determining That
Melvinfs "New Evidence" Did Not Justify Relief From Judgment Under
Rule 60(b)(2).

Melvin also attempts to make a "smoking gun" out of "new evidence."8 Melvin's
supposed "new evidence" is that Franklin Covey Co., in an unrelated case, admitted it is a
separate company from Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. (Appellant's Brief at 37). The
supposed "new evidence" is Franklin Covey Co.'s Answer to a Complaint filed against it by
a former employee in California. In its Answer to the California Complaint, Franklin Covey
Co. asserted that Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. was that plaintiffs true employer-a
position identical with that asserted in this case and perfectly consistent with the trial
court's prior rulings. (Franklin Covey Co.'s California Answer, R. 535 at f 29). The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Melvin's Rule 60(b)(2) motion based on this
"new evidence."

8

This allegedly "new evidence" does not qualify as new evidence under Rule 60(b)(2).
Rule 60(b)(2) requires that the newly discovered evidence must have been evidence that could
not have been discovered by due diligence in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b). In
this instance, the "new evidence" is Franklin Covey Co.?s Answer to a California Complaint.
The Answer was filed on June 25,1998, which was prior to the trial court's ruling on Franklin
Coveyfs Motion for Summary Judgment and Melvin's Motions to Dismiss. Accordingly, this
evidence could have been discovered through due diligence in time for Melvin to assert it in a
Rule 59(b) motion. Therefore, this allegedly "new evidence" does not fall within Rule 60(b)(2)
and was not a basis for relieffromjudgment.
27
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

C.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Determining That the
Consent to be Bound Was Proper and Thus Refusing to Relieve Melvin
From the Declaratory Judgment Based on Fraud Under Rule 60(b)(3),

In his Rule 60(b)(3) motion, Melvin argued that the alleged existence of fraud justified
setting aside the trial court's prior orders. His fraud claim is loosely based on the
disingenuous belief that Franklin Covey Co.fs counsel lacked authority to submit the Consent
to be Bound because counsel for Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. did not also represent
Franklin Covey Co. Of course, Melvin had absolutely no basis for this unsubstantiated
allegation. More seriously, however, Melvin had actual knowledge that this firm represents
Franklin Covey Co. Melvin sued both Franklin Covey Co. and Franklin Covey Client Sales,
Inc. in Maryland federal court. This firm entered an appearance on behalf of both entities.
(Franklin Coveyfs Memorandum in Opposition to Melvin's Motion for Sanctions, R. 592).
Therefore, he has no basis to claim that this firm does not represent both entities.
Melvin contests the validity of the Consent to Be Bound because he confuses it with
the actual assignment, rather than notice of the assignment. This confusion is inexplicable.
It was obvious that the Consent to be Bound was a pleading, not the actual assignment. The
Consent to be Bound explained that Franklin Covey Co. "hereby acknowledges an
assignment to it of any rights which may be necessary (if any) to entitle [Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc.] to prosecute this action as the real-party-in-interest." (Exhibit B to
Franklin Covers Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R.
303). The actual assignment was executed by Franklin Covey Co.'s President and
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Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc/s Vice President, a copy of which was previously
provided to Melvin and filed with the trial court. (R. 617). Melvin has no basis for his
fraud claim and, therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside
its earlier Order on the basis of fraud.
II.

MELVIN IS SUBJECT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION BECAUSE HE
SEEKS COMPENSATION "ARISING OUT OF" HIS CONTACTS WITH
UTAH.
The trial court correctly determined that it had specific personal jurisdiction over

Melvin. In his Declaration, which Melvin attached to his Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction or in the Alternative to Change Venue, Melvin admitted significant
contacts and ten trips to Utah directly related to his employment. (Declaration attached to
Melvin's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, R. 71-74). In his Maryland
Complaint, Melvin also alleged that he procured a "major new customer" for Franklin Covey
while in Utah and demanded compensation for his work in Utah. (Exhibit B to Franklin
Covey's Complaint, R. 11 at Tf 15). As a result, the trial court properly exercised specific
personal jurisdiction over Melvin.
Under Utah law, a three-part inquiry is used to determine whether specific jurisdiction
exists: "(1) the defendant's acts or contacts must satisfy the Utah long-arm statute; (2) a
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f

nexusf must exist between the plaintiffs claims and the defendant's acts or contacts; and (3)

application of the Utah long-arm statute must satisfy the requirements of federal due
process." SIIMegadiamond, Inc. v. American Superabrasives Corp., 969 P.2d 430, 433-35
(Utahl998). 9
A.

Melvin Has "Transacted Business" Under the Utah Long-Arm Statute.

The Utah long-arm statute is satisfied if Melvin has "transacted] any business within
the state." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24(a) (1996) (emphasis added). A person transacts
business when he engages in any activity which "affect persons or businesses within the state
of Utah." Id. at § 78-27-23. The Utah Supreme Court has given liberal construction to the
Utah long-arm statute in general. See Synergestics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d
1106, 1110 (Utah 1985) (Utah long-arm statute is broad and invites liberal application). In
fact, a defendant need not be present in the state in order to transact business in Utah. SII
Megadiamond, 969 P.2d at 433-34 (actual physical presence in forum not required); see also
Brown v. Washoe Housing Auth., 625 F. Supp. 595, 599 (D. Utah 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 835 F.2d 1327 (10th Cir. 1988) (actual presence in state not required to transact
business in state). Even a single phone call to a Utah resident is sufficient to satisfy the
"transacting business" threshold because such a call "affects persons and businesses

9

In his brief, Melvin argues at length that he is not subject to general jurisdiction. This is
not disputed. Melvin does not have such "continuous and systematic contacts" with the forum
such that he could be haled into a Utah court on matters unrelated to his dealings with Franklin
Covey. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984).
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within the State of Utah/1 Nova Mud Corp. v. Fletcher, 648 F. Supp. 1123, 1126 (D.
Utah 1986);see also Neways, Inc. v. McCausland, 950 P.2d 420,423 (Utah 1993) (telephone
contact with agents in Utah to solicit orders and acceptance of payments originating in Utah
constitute "transaction of any business"); G.M. Diesel Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 578 P.2d
850, 853 (Utah 1978) (under the long-arm or "transaction of business concept," personal
jurisdiction may be asserted with only minimum contacts if the claims arise out of activity
within the forum-state); Kamdar & Co. v. Laray Co., Inc., 815 P.2d 245,248 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (sending financial records to Utah for preparation of financial statements and tax
returns constitute a "business transaction").
Melvin "transacted business" in Utah under the long-arm statute. He made ten trips
to Utah to conduct business here; he was an employee of a Utah resident; his direct
supervisor was in Utah during the first year of his employment; and he acknowledged having
regularly spoken with other Franklin Covey employees in Utah.

(Franklin Coveyfs

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction, R. 122). Melvinfs conduct clearly falls within the broad parameters of the Utah
long-arm statute.
B.

There is a "Nexus" Between Melvin's Contacts With Utah and the Claims
Raised in the Declaratory Judgment Action.

The "nexus" requirement is satisfied when a non-resident engages in conduct within
the state and the plaintiffs claims against the defendant "arise from" that conduct. SII
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Megadiamond, 969 P.2d at 435; Neways, Inc., 950 P.2d at 423. Melvinfs own pleadings
conclusively establish that this prong is satisfied.
Melvin's Maryland Complaint and Melvinfs Declaration acknowledge that he traveled
to Utah on at least ten separate occasions and that he transacted business with Franklin
Covey while in Utah. (Id. at R. 122). Melvin further acknowledged that he corresponded
with co-workers in Utah in order to make sales in his assigned territory (Id. at R. 122-23).
Most significantly, Melvin plead in his own Maryland Complaint that:
On one or more occasions, Melvin traveled to Utah to meet with
potential customers of Franklin Covey to help develop a
relationship. In particular, Melvin met with representatives of
GEC-Marconi Hazeltine in Salt Lake City in May 1997.
Melvinfs efforts resulted in the development of a major new
customer for Franklin. Franklin has not compensated
Melvin for his efforts with GEC-Marconi Hazeltine.
(Id. at R. 123). Melvinfs claim against Franklin Covey seeks compensation for work he
admits performing in Utah. Melvin has affirmatively pled that he came here to conduct
business, that he conducted business here, and now he demands payment for the work he
alleges he performed here. His conduct, his contact with the forum and the claim he asserts
are inextricably and directly linked. Melvin's claim has a direct, immediate, and inescapable
nexus to his contacts with Utah.
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C.

The Court's Exercise of Jurisdiction Comported With the Requirements
of Due Process.

Due process is satisfied when an individual has "fair warning that a particular activity
may subject him to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
218 (1977). This requirement is satisfied when, as here, "the defendant has purposefully
directed his activities at residents of the forum and litigation results form alleged injuries that
'arise out of or relate to' these activities." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
472 (1985). Due process mandates consideration of "(1) whether the cause of action arises
out of or has a substantial connection with the activity; (2) the balance of the convenience
of the parties and the interest of the state in assuming jurisdiction; and (3) the character of
the defendant's activities within the State." Ted R. Brown & Assoc, v. Carnes Corp., 611
P.2d 378, 380 (Utah 1980).
Melvin cannot have it both ways. He alleged in his Maryland Complaint that he came
to Utah "on one or more occasions" to help develop a relationship with existing or potential
clients and alleges that his "efforts resulted in development of a major new account for
Franklin." (Franklin Covey's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, R. 123). He now asks the Court to take seriously his
argument that he "never knowingly, intentionally or unintentionally, subjected himself to the
jurisdiction of the Utah courts." (Appellant's Brief at 33). Melvin asserted a claim against
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Franklin Covey that derived directly from his contacts with this forum. Melvin simply
cannot say that he has not had "fair warning" that he would be haled before a Utah court for
matters related to work he alleged he performed here.
Moreover, the trial court's determination that Melvin is subject to personal jurisdiction
is hardly "tortured" as Melvin asserts in his principal brief. (Id. at 41). Melvin warns this
cases pushes the limits of personal jurisdiction because a gigantic multi-national corporation
could sue its employees in any forum "although the employee's only contact may have been
to drive through the state once or twice on his way to some other destination." (Id. at 42).
Melvinfs apocalyptic vision bears no resemblance to this case. The trial court found correctly
that Melvin is subject to personal jurisdiction based upon: (1) Melvinfs admission of at least
ten trips to Utah related to his employment; and (2) Melvin's allegation that Franklin Covey
owed him commissions specifically arising out of his efforts in Utah to solicit a major new
customer. Under well-defined Utah law, Melvin transacted business in Utah subjecting him
to personal jurisdiction by the courts of this state. See, e.g., Radcliffe v. Akhaven, 875 P.2d
608 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Kamdar & Co. v. Laray Co., 815 P.2d 245 (Utah Ct. App.
1991); Harnischfeger Eng'rs, Inc. v. Uniflo Conveyor, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 608 (D. Utah
1995). As a result, the trial court correctly determined it could exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over Melvin and the trial court's decision should be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Melvin's Motions for Relief of Judgment under Rule 60(b)(1), (2) and (3) and the trial court
correctly determined that it had specific personal jurisdiction over Melvin. Therefore, the
trial court's November 10, 1998 Memorandum Decision should be affirmed.
DATED this 18th day of August, 1999.
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW &
BEDNAR LLC

LJ_
Steven C. Bednar
Attorneys for Franklin Covey Client Sales,
Inc.
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